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ARTICLE
POST-EXPIRY PATENT LOSSES: RECOVERABLE, BUT UNPREVENTABLE?
Kiernan A. Murphy*

Liability for patent infringement is statutorily limited to the term of the
patent. However nothing limits recovery to losses suffered during that same
term. Since patent infringement is tort-like in many respects, traditional
damages principles apply to quantify damages suffered after the expiry of the
patent. Recent Canadian and English case law has indicated a willingness to
consider such recovery. Consequently, the courts may be far less willing to
grant springboarding injunctions. Patentees seeking to prevent
springboarders must satisfy the tripartite interlocutory injunction test, which
requires demonstration of irreparable harm. Since post-expiry losses may
now be considered quantifiable and recoverable, a patentee will seldom
demonstrate that it will suffer irreparable harm. This article argues that
losses suffered after a patent has expired due to pre-expiry infringement of
that patent are recoverable and that the recoverability of post-expiry patent
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losses will all but preclude the availability of interlocutory injunctions to
restrain springboard infringement.
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I
INTRODUCTION
The Patent Act (the “Act”) protects patentees for almost the
full life of the patent, which in Canada is twenty years from the date
it is filed.1 During the term of the patent, the patentee has the
exclusive right of “making, constructing, using the invention and
selling it to others.”2 Since the patentee can only claim relief under
the statute for a patent infringement – in other words a violation of
the patentee‟s exclusive rights in relation to a patented product – this
seems on its face to protect the patentee solely during the term of the
patent.3
Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-4, s.44 [Act].
Act, supra note 1, s.42.
3 Act, supra note 1, s.55.
1
2
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However, it is clear that the benefit of patent protection may
extend beyond the term of the patent. In a classic English patent case,
the House of Lords recognized that, at least in some industries, in that
case medical technologies, “the benefit of the monopoly granted by
the patent derives from the fact that the patented product is given the
opportunity of becoming established and this benefit continues to be
reaped after the patent has expired.”4 Although this statement was
made in the context of a new pharmaceutical product used exclusively
by doctors which, as the court noted, takes a long time to become
established in the market, most patents will provide some benefit
post-expiry. In fact, the question is merely one of degree.
Further, it is readily conceivable that actions occurring during
the life of the patent may have repercussions on this post-expiry
benefit. For example, a competitor‟s early access to the market might
impair the patentee‟s capacity to compete with the infringing
competitor once the patent has expired, whereas the two may have
co-existed competitively had the infringement not occurred. This
early market access provides the infringer with a springboard, or a
head start, into the unpatented commercial arena.
This Article argues that losses suffered after a patent has
expired due to pre-expiry infringement of that patent are recoverable.
Nothing in the Act suggests that recovery is limited to losses suffered
during the term of the patent. Further, traditional tort liability
principles are applicable and well-suited to assess losses suffered due
to patent infringement, which is itself tort-like.
This Article further argues that the recoverability of postexpiry patent losses will all but preclude the availability of
interlocutory injunctions to restrain springboard infringement.
Interlocutory injunctions, ordered only where the harm suffered will
be irreparable – unquantifiable or unrecoverable – are seldom granted
in patent cases because infringement losses are often commercial in
nature and thus quantifiable and recoverable. Losses occurring after
the term of the patent are generally assumed to be unrecoverable and
therefore potentially irreparable. The recoverability of such losses
effectively removes them from the ambit of irreparable harm except
in special circumstances and thus further hinders patentees seeking to
restrain springboarding infringement before trial.
4

American Cyanamid v. Ethicon, [1975] AC 396 (HL).

135

Initially, the springboard concept was considered within the
context of a breach of confidential information. In Cadbury Scheppes
Inc. v. FBI Foods Ltd., the Supreme Court of Canada cited another old
English case to the effect that “a person who has obtained information
in confidence is not allowed to use it as a spring-board for activities
detrimental to the person who made the confidential
communication.”5 In International Corona Resources Ltd. v. Lac
Minerals Ltd., both the majority and the minority agreed that the
confidential information was the springboard that led to the benefit,
in that case a very valuable plot of land.6
However, springboarding has now evolved to include patent
infringement before the expiry of the patent as a means to achieve
more rapid market penetration:
Springboarding refers to a competitor establishing a generic
brand in the market in advance of the expiry of the
innovator‟s patent. Early entry into the marketplace allows
the competitor to „ramp up‟ and achieve a share of market
penetration prior to the expiration of the patent in issue. 7

The issue in such a case is the consequences of the
infringement after the patent expires. It is clear that a patentee can
request relief for the infringement itself. It is not so clear whether
any post-expiry loss can be claimed. However, surely such losses do
Cadbury Schweppes Inc. v. FBI Foods Ltd., [1999] 1 S.C.R. 142 at para.67. Roger T.
Hughes and Dino P. Clarizio, Hughes and Woodley on Patents, 2d ed. (Toronto:
LexisNexis, 2008) at para. 103 [Hughes and Clarizio]. set out a similar definition:
“Where knowledge was in fact available to the public and could be collected by
someone having sufficient time and desire to do so, without violating any obligation
as to secrecy, nonetheless in instances where effort has been expended in acquiring
and collecting such knowledge which was then turned over to a person for a limited
purpose, the Courts will restrain that person from using the knowledge for another
purpose.”
6 International Corona Resources Ltd. v. Lac Minerals Ltd. , [1989] 2 S.C.R. 574.
7 Bayer Healthcare AG v. Sandoz Canada Inc. , 2007 FC 352 at para. 51 [ Bayer
Healthcare]. See also Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co. v. Apotex Inc. (2001) 15 C.P.R. (4th)
190 at para. 16 (F.C.T.D.) [Bristol-Meyers Squibb]: “„Springboarding‟, as the plaintiffs
use that term, refers to Apotex establishing its generic brand in the market in advance
of expiry of plaintiffs' patent, by marketing its product and obtaining formulary
listings across Canada. An early entry or „ramp up‟ into to the market allows Apotex
early „market penetration‟, before expiry of the patent in suit.”
5
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arise.8
If, as mentioned previously, patent protection entitles
patentees to establish their position in the market prior to the expiry
of their patent, and springboarding allows a competitor to achieve
more rapid market penetration, in other words to circumvent the
patentees established position, prima facie patentees would seem to
lose a benefit that they are entitled to under patent law. The question
is whether Canadian patent law does in fact protect the patentee
against such post-expiry losses.
The issue of losses occurring after the expiry of the patent
arises in three different ways. First, an infringement action may be
brought subsequent to the expiry of the patent. Post-expiry losses will
therefore comprise two components: known, or estimated, losses
already having occurred and future losses. The Act, however, grants
relief only for infringements committed less than six years prior to the
commencement of the action9 and therefore this scenario has a
limited window of occurrence. Second, the action could be tried
subsequent to the expiry of the patent despite the fact that the action
was launched during the life of the patent. Post-expiry losses would
comprise the same two components as in the first scenario. Third,
patentees may enforce the patent during its term, with the trial of the
action occurring before the expiry of the patent. At the time of trial,
no post-expiry losses will have been suffered as the patent is still
within its term, and thus all post-expiry losses would be future losses.
Before considering the potential recovery of post-expiry
patent losses, some terminology should be defined. In Canada, the act
of infringing a patent in order to better one‟s position after the patent
expires is generally referred to as springboarding. It often involves an
infringement shortly before the expiry of the patent rather than early
in the patent‟s life as there is insufficient time to resolve an action
before the expiry of the patent and so the infringing competitor gains
valuable direct access to the post-expiry market during the life of the
patent.10 Springboard imagery aptly portrays this reality.
See for example Gerber Garment Technology v. Lectra System Ltd., [1995] R.P.C.
383 at 393 (Pat. Ct.) [Gerber Garment Technology], where Jacob J. accepted that the
patentee lost sales of its formerly patented product because the defendant‟s
infringement enabled it to accelerate its entry into market.
9 Act, supra note 1, s.55.01.
10 Baker Hughes Inc. v. Galvanic Analytical Systems Ltd. (1991), 37 C.P.R. (3d) 512 at
515 (F.C.T.D.).
8
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In American jurisprudence, this same act is often referred to
as accelerated market entry. Though both terms are appropriate, this
more general American term will be used herein. Although
infringement just before the end of the patent may have significantly
more impact than it would earlier in the patent life, the issue is one of
post-expiry loss due to an accelerated market entry. The effect of an
infringement, regardless of when it occurred, on post-expiry market
share is one of degree and therefore should not be dismissed merely
because it does not fit the metaphor of a springboard. An infringer
late in the life of a patent may well gain a springboard into the postexpiry market. However, an earlier infringer nonetheless will likely
gain some benefit, even if minimal.
Part II of this paper sets out the remedies available to
patentees. As this paper focuses on the recoverability of damages for
and prevention of loss occurring post expiry, only damages and
injunctions are truly relevant. Since successful patent infringement
actions typically give rise to a permanent injunction,11 no further
discussion of that remedy is necessary. However, interlocutory
injunctions are particularly relevant to this issue, in particular since
patent infringement actions are frequently quite long and may be
decided only after the patent expires, thus rendering the availability
of a permanent injunction futile. Part III analyzes the law on
recovery of post-expiry losses and sets out the case in favour of such
recovery.
Part IV examines the availability of interlocutory
injunctions in springboarding cases.
II
DAMAGES AND INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTIONS IN PATENT LAW
Before addressing whether post-expiry loss can be remedied or
springboarding can be prevented, it is instructive to set out some of
the remedies available to patentees. Upon the court declaring a patent
to be infringed, the patentee may claim a variety of remedies,
including damages, an accounting of profits, an injunction or
delivery-up.12 Prior to successfully establishing infringement, the

11
12

The statutory basis for this remedy is found in the Act, supra note 1, s.57(1).
Act, supra note 1, ss.55, 57.
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patentee may also apply for interlocutory relief.13
As the focus of this paper is post-expiry patent damages and
interlocutory injunctions against springboarding, only damages and
injunctions will be discussed in more detail.
A. GENERAL APPROACH TO PATENT REMEDIES
Although patents are a statutory creature, the principles of
tort law generally apply and may clarify any legislative gaps. The
courts have long recognized that patent infringement is analogous to,
if not actually, a tort: “every [infringing] sale is a tort.”14 In particular,
as one author recently pointed out, “damages principles in intellectual
property cases are generally consistent with a modern understanding
of general tort principles.”15 The author cited a relatively recent
English case for the proposition that, as above, “infringement of a
patent is a statutory tort” and therefore one could expect the damage
recoverable to be governed by the same rules as in tort law.16
Therefore it is instructive to review some basic tort law
principles pertaining to damages and injunctions when addressing
how these remedies work in the patent context.
B. DAMAGES
Damages are meant to compensate the claimant for damage,
loss or injury suffered,17 and thus place that claimant, in Lord
Blackburn‟s words, in the “same position as he would have been if he
had not sustained the wrong for which he is now getting
compensation or reparation.”18 In patent cases, the purpose of an

Act, supra note 1, s. 57(1).
J.R.. Short Milling Co. (Canada) Ltd. v. Continental Soya Co. et al. (1942), 2 C.P.R.
158 at 161 (Ex. Ct.) [J.R. Short Milling].
15 Norman Siebrasse et al., Damages Calculations In Intellectual Property Cases in
Canada (Toronto: Cole & Partners, 2001) at 1. [Siebrasse et al.]
16 Gerber Garment Technology v. Lectra System Ltd., [1997] R.P.C. 443 at 452,
Staughton L.J. (C.A.) [Gerber Garment Technology].
17 Harvey McGregor, McGregor on Damages (Toronto: Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) at
13
14

para.1-020.
18 Ibid. at para.1-022. See also Gerber Garment Technology, supra note 8 at 393 (Pat.
Ct.). Lord Blackburn‟s statement has also been adopted in Canadian patent law:
AlliedSignal Inc. v. Du Pont Canada Inc. (1998), 78 C.P.R. (3d) 129 at para. 19
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award of damages for infringement has been similarly described as
seeking to “compensate the plaintiff for any losses suffered by the
plaintiff as a result of the infringement.”19
Although accuracy is often impossible and imagination must
be exercised, an assessment of damages must not be generous because
damages are meant to compensate, not penalize or punish.20
Nonetheless, damages are calculated liberally.21
Two other limiting factors are key in a damages assessment:
the loss must effectively be caused by the tort 22 and the loss must be
reasonably foreseeable.23
A concise framework for assessing tort damages was set out in
Gerber Garment Technology v. Lectra System Ltd.:
(1)…the overriding principle is that the victim should be
restored to the position he would have been in if no wrong
had been done, and (2) …the victim can recover loss which
was (i) foreseeable, (ii) caused by the wrong, and (iii) not
excluded from recovery by public or social policy. The
requirement of causation is sometimes confused with
foreseeability, which is remoteness.
The two are
24
different…

Damages awards under patent law differ slightly than under
tort law because the patents, and associated remedies, are statutory in
nature. However, as discussed previously, the underlying principles
apply in a similar manner.
(F.C.T.D.) citing General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co., [1976]
R.P.C. 197 at 212, [1975] All E.R. 173, per Wilberforce L.J(H.L.).
19 Bayer Aktiengesellschaft v. Apotex Inc. (2001), 10 C.P.R. (4 th) 151 at 156 (Ont. Sup.
Ct.), as cited in Jay-Lor International Inc. v. Penta Farm Systems Ltd., 2007 FC 358 at
para.114.
20 J.R. Short Milling, supra note 14, at 168-169.
21 Watson Laidlaw Co. Ltd. v. Pott, Cassells and Williamson (1914), 31 R.P.C. 104 at
117-118 (H.L.).
22 Schrump v. Koot (1977), 82 D.L.R. (3d) 553 (Ont. C.A.).
23 Kienzle v. Stringer (1981), 35 O.R. (2d) 85 (Ont. C.A.). Although Asamera Oil
Corp. Ltd. v. Sea Oil & General Corp., [1979] 1 S.C.R. 633 dealt with a breach of
contract, the Supreme Court recognized both the reasonable contemplation test in
contract law and the reasonable foreseeability test in torts.
24 Gerber Garment Technology, supra note 16, at 452, Staughton L.J. (C.A.)
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The starting point for damages in patent actions is section
55(1) of the Act which imposes liability on infringers “for all damages
sustained by the patentee…after the grant of the patent, by reason of
the infringement.”25 The patentee, in addition to demonstrating a
defendant is liable for infringement, must establish the quantum of
damages.26
As with tort claims, causation is central to assessing
intellectual property damages: “damages are measured by the
difference between the actual position of the plaintiff and the position
of the plaintiff but for the actual infringement.”27 Therefore the
damages a patentee can claim are generally limited to those they can
establish that will satisfy the but-for test. This often translates to
showing that the patentee lost sales due to the defendant‟s
infringement.28 The causation test has alternatively been stated as
requiring the plaintiff‟s loss to be “a direct consequence” of the
defendant‟s infringing activities.29
However, damages in patent may be more broadly assessed. A
patentee may also be compensated for infringing sales that they would
not have made since, as mentioned previously, every sale is a tort. In
those cases, the courts will allow damages for an amount equivalent to
a reasonable royalty.30
Further, a patentee‟s losses must not be too remote.31
However, unlike under tort law, this aspect of the analysis may simply
Act, supra note 1, s.55(1). Paragraph (2) specifies that the patentee is also entitled
to “reasonable compensation” once the patent is “open to public inspection,” but
before it is granted.
26 Jay-Lor International Inc. v. Penta Farm Systems Ltd. , 2007 FC 358 at para.118 [JayLor International].
27 Siebrasse et al, supra note 15 at 1. See also Lubrizol Corp. v. Imperial Oil Ltd.
(1996), 71 C.P.R. (3d) 26 at para. 9 (F.C.A.) [ Lubrizol].
28 See AlliedSignal Inc. v. Du Pont Canada Inc. (1998), 78 C.P.R. (3d) 129 at para. 32
(F.C.T.D.) [Allied Signal]: “The question is whether the plaintiff would have made
the sales actually made by the defendant, but for the presence of the defendant‟s
infringing product in the market.” See also Jay-Lor International, supra note 26, at
para.123: “In assessing the award, the plaintiff is entitled to the profits on the sales it
would have made but for the presence of the infringing product in the market.” See
also J.R. Short Milling, supra note 14 at 164 (Ex. Ct.).
29 Randall J. Hofley & Nicholas McHaffie, “Litigation”, in Stikeman Elliott (ed.),
Intellectual Property Law: Canada (Huntington NY: Juris Publishing, 2002-) at 9-55.
30 J.R. Short Milling, supra note 14 at 161 (Ex. Ct.).
31 Lubrizol, supra note 27 at para. 9 (F.C.A.).
25
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entail determining whether, despite satisfying the causation
requirement, the loss should nonetheless be excluded for public or
social policy reasons. Foreseeability is rarely a consideration because,
as Professor Siebrasse notes, “the nature of the typical loss in
intellectual property cases – lost sales or licensing revenue – is always
foreseeable.”32 Where the loss is not typical, the court may still assess
it as foreseeable.
Although there are various types of losses due to infringement
– for example, lost profits, loss of market, price depression – damage
awards are “assessed on two mutually exclusive bases: one being
damages for lost manufacturing profits, the other being damages for
loss of royalties.”33 This approach recognizes that a patentee will
either make the patented invention themselves or will licence the
right to do so, and the loss stems from one of these situations.
C. INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTIONS
The modern test for granting an interlocutory injunction was
set out in RJR-MacDonald v. Canada (Attorney General) (“RJRMacDonald”):
First, a preliminary assessment must be made of the merits
of the case to ensure that there is a serious question to be
tried. Secondly, it must be determined whether the
applicant would suffer irreparable harm if the application
were refused. Finally, an assessment must be made as to
which of the parties would suffer greater harm from the
granting or refusal of the remedy pending a decision on the
merits.34

The first branch of the test, the preliminary assessment,
parallels that stated in American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd.,
subject to the occasional reversion to a stricter standard.35 The
Siebrasse et al, supra note 15 at 2.
Hughes and Clarizio, Hughes and Woodley on Patents, supra note 5 at para. 53.
34 RJR-MacDonal v. Canada (Attorney General) , [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311, S.C.J. No. 17 at
para. 43 [RJR-MacDonald].
35 Ibid. at para. 44. At paras. 49-50, Sopinka and Cory JJ. further held that the
“threshold is a low one. The judge on the application must make a preliminary
32
33
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preliminary assessment is satisfied where “the claim is not frivolous or
vexatious; in other words, that there is a serious question to be tried.”
With respect to irreparable harm, the issue is whether “refusal
to grant relief could so adversely affect the applicants‟ own interests
that the harm could not be remedied” if the applicant later won on
the merits.36
Irreparable harm “refers to the nature of the harm suffered
rather than its magnitude. It is harm which either cannot be
quantified in monetary terms or which cannot be cured.”37 The
Supreme Court has identified several examples of irreparable harm,
namely bankruptcy, permanent market loss or irrevocable damage to
one‟s business reputation.38 Economic harm is therefore clearly
included within the ambit of irreparable harm.39 It is also important
to note that quantification and curability are disjunctive, and thus
harm need not be both unquantifiable and incurable.
Under the balance of convenience analysis, although “it is a
counsel of prudence to… preserve the status quo”, “this approach
would seem to be of limited value in private law cases.”40
The tripartite interlocutory injunction test set out in RJRMacDonald has been accepted in patent cases.41 However, on the first
branch of the test, the Federal Court Trial Division has noted that the
court “must look to all the facts showing infringement and decide if
the applicant requesting interlocutory injunction has a reasonable
chance of success at trial.” It mattered not whether one termed the
question “an arguable case, a prima facie case or a strong prima facie
case.”42
As for irreparable harm, there must be “clear and not
assessment of the merits of the case” and later that a “prolonged examination of the
merits is generally neither necessary nor desirable.”
36 Ibid. at para. 58.
37 Ibid. at para.59.
38 Ibid. at para.59.
39 However, Sopinka and Cory JJ. dismissed the notion that being “forced to spend
very large sums of money” are monetary losses that “will not usually be[sic]amount to
irreparable harm in private law cases.” See Ibid. at para.84.
40 Ibid. at para.75. Bristol-Meyers Squibb, supra note 7 at para. 12 (F.C.T.D.).
41 Bayer Healthcare, supra note 7 at para. 23.
42 Procter & Gamble Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Canada Inc. (1995), 61 C.P.R. (3d) 160
at 169 (F.C.T.D.) [Procter & Gamble].
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speculative” evidence that the infringing activity will irreparably
harm the patentee.43 In addition, it is not sufficient to show a
probability of irreparable harm; the patentee must establish that this
harm will occur if the interlocutory injunction is not granted.44 The
court also confirmed that it is the nature of the harm suffered rather
than its magnitude which determines irreparability, and, further,
difficulty in calculating damages is insufficient to establish irreparable
harm so long as there is some way of reasonably measuring those
damages.45
In patent cases, a permanent injunction upon finding that a
defendant has infringed a patent has become so prevalent that there
seems to be a presumption in favour of granting such a remedy. For
example, Justice Hughes, in his text on Canadian patent law, notes
that a permanent injunction “normally follows a finding of
infringement… after trial” and does not even allude to the possibility
of a permanent injunction not being issued.46 The Act, in fact,
expressly provides for orders “restraining or enjoining the opposite
party from further use, manufacture or sale of the subject-matter of
the patent.”47
For interlocutory injunctions, however, the contrary seems
almost to be true. One commentator claims that “patent infringement
actions are among the most difficult in which to obtain an
interlocutory injunction,” largely due to the difficulty of proving
irreparable damages. The courts are particularly reluctant to prevent
the defendant from infringing a patent when the validity of the patent
is challenged or the patent is newly issued.48 This is in stark contrast
Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Novopharm Ltd., 2005 FC 815, 40 C.P.R. (4th) 210 at para.
59 (F.C.T.D.); aff‟d 2005 FCA 390, 44 C.P.R. (4 th) 326.
44 Bristol-Meyers Squibb, supra note 7 at para. 14 (F.C.T.D.).
45 Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Novopharm Ltd., 2005 FC 815, 40 C.P.R. (4th) 210 at paras.
60-61 (F.C.T.D.); aff‟d 2005 FCA 390, 44 C.P.R. (4 th) 326.
46 Hughes and Clarizio, Hughes and Woodley on Patents, supra note 5 at para. 53.
See also Ronald E. Dimock, Intellectual Property Disputes: Resolutions and Remedies,
looseleaf (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2004) vol. 2 at 15-2 [Dimock, Intellectual
Property Disputes].
47 Act, supra note 1, s.57(1).
48 Dimock, Intellectual Property Disputes, supra note 46 at 15-22. See also Hughes
and Clarizio, Hughes and Woodley on Patents, supra note 5 at para. 53: “[I]n patent
actions the Court has usually stated that any damages sustained may be sufficiently
compensated in money, and refused interlocutory injunctions. There is no
presumption that interlocutory injunctions should not be granted in patent cases;
43
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to statements in American Cyanamid, which was widely accepted by
the Supreme Court in setting out the test for interlocutory
injunctions, wherein the House of Lords noted that elaborate
examination procedures to be performed by expert examiners, the
opportunity for opposition and provision for appeal “make the grant
of a patent… a good prima facie reason… for supposing the patent to
be valid.” Therefore interlocutory injunctions in patent cases should
be governed by the same principles as in other actions.49
One reason invoked for refusing to order an interlocutory
injunction is the practice that has developed whereby the defendant
undertakes to keep an account of the infringing sales. Where such an
undertaking is accepted and there is no reason to believe the
defendant will not be capable of paying the damages that may be
awarded, damages are likely to be an “adequate remedy” for the
infringement.50
Despite the infrequent success of interlocutory injunction
applications in patent cases, there are no legitimate policy or historic
reasons for presumptively denying interlocutory injunctions. Indeed,
one court has previously held as such: “I simply do not accept that
there is a presumption that interlocutory injunctions should not be
granted in patent cases.”51 Another Canadian court echoed the
American Cyanamid dicta to the effect that the same general
principles apply in patent cases as in other suits.52 However, to the
extent that interlocutory injunctions are denied due to the nature of
the wrong and the harm that ensues, this judicial reluctance may well
be justified.

however, the Courts are reluctant to grant relief unless there is a hearing of full
evidence.” See also Allergan Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc. (1985), 7
C.P.R. (3d) 209 at 214 (F.C.T.D.). See also Wellcome Foundation Ltd. v. Interpharm
Inc. (1992), 41 C.P.R. (3d) 215 at 225 (F.C.T.D.).
49 American Cyanamid v. Ethicon, [1975] AC 396 (HL).
50 Cutter Ltd. v. Baxter Travenol Laboratories of Canada Ltd. (1980), 47 C.P.R. (2d) 53
at 55-56 (F.C.A.).
51 Samsonite Corp. v. Holiday Luggage Inc. (1988), 20 C.P.R. (3d) 291 at 309, 21
C.I.P.R. 286, 9 A.C.W.S. (3d) 440 (F.C.T.D.).
52 Proctor & Gamble v. Nabisco Brands Ltd./Nabisco Brands Ltee (1984), 82 C.P.R.
(2d) 224 at 225, [1984] 2 F.C. 475 (T.D.)
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III
POST-EXPIRY PATENT DAMAGES
A. TRADITIONAL CANADIAN APPROACH
Participants in patent cases, be they parties or judges, often
presume that damages are limited to the term of the patent. Plaintiffs
seeking to enforce their patent rights often claim damages only in
respect of infringing acts until the date the patent expires.53 Courts
will generally limit recovery to this same period. A particularly apt
example of this approach is the following statement by the Federal
Court: “The damages or loss of profits are limited, I assume, to the
date of expiration of the patent.”54 In the Federal Court of Appeal, in
assessing an application for an interlocutory injunction for
springboarding, the court held that losses arising after the expiry of
the patent due to increased competition linked to infringements
occurring during the term of the patent were irrelevant. “Protection
beyond the expiry of the patent is not something to which the
patentee is entitled under the patent.”55
Further, Justice Hughes, in his widely used text on Canadian
patent law, implicitly suggests that post-expiry damages are not
recoverable when, in discussing the timeframes for recovery, he notes
that “an accumulation of damages and reasonable compensation as
remedies could be calculated over a period of up to 18½ years.”56 The
number of years set out by Justice Hughes equals the period from the
time the patent is published to its expiry, in other words it reflects the
life of the patent. However, Justice Hughes later recognizes the
possibility of awarding damages for future losses, though it is unclear
whether such losses include those beyond the term of the patent.57

See for example Quadco Equipment Inc. v. Timberjack Inc., 2002 FCT 96 at para. 8.
Xerox Canada Ltd. v. IBM Canada Ltd. (1977), 33 C.P.R. (2d) 24, F.C.J. No. 603 at
para. 121 (F.C.T.D.).
55 Cutter Ltd. v. Baxter Travenol Laboratories of Canada Ltd. (1980), 47 C.P.R. (2d) 53
at 57 (F.C.A.). Thurlow C.J, for the majority, also explicitly held that the
springboarding evidence in that case was “purely speculative”.
56 Hughes and Clarizio, Hughes and Woodley on Patents, supra note 5 at para. 54.
57 Ibid at para. 53.
53
54
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B. THE CASE FOR POST-EXPIRY PATENT DAMAGES
In so far as Canadian courts are reluctant to award damages to
patentees for losses occurring beyond the life of the patent, Canada
seems to lag behind English counterparts.
The trial58 and appeal59 decisions in Gerber Garment
Technology Inc. v. Lectra Systems Ltd. are the leading English cases
on springboarding and post-expiry patent losses. At trial, the
defendant was held to have infringed the plaintiff‟s patent and an
inquiry into damages ensued. Jacob J. approved of damage awards for
ancillary losses, including post-expiry losses, holding that failure to
recompense the plaintiff for foreseeable ancillary losses whose source
and origin are wrongful acts of infringement might encourage, where
the benefit is large enough, competitors to infringe patented products,
in particular jurisdictions where exemplary or punitive damages
unavailable. Jacob J. dismissed the claims that such damages awards
widen the ambit of the patentee‟s monopoly as it merely involves an
inquiry into the effect of the invasion of the patentee‟s existing
monopoly. Jacob J. further rejected the argument that the losses are
too remote because “economic damage is as a practical matter bound
to follow from the infringement.” 60
Jacob J. then held that secondary losses, including post-expiry
damages, were recoverable “provided that secondary loss is a
foreseeable consequence of the infringement” and the patentee can
establish that “such loss…results from the infringer establishing a
business pre-expiry. In all these cases, it remains critical that the
patentee establish the factual basis: that his loss is caused by the
infringement and foreseeably so.”61
Staughton L.J., for a unanimous Court of Appeal on this point,
affirmed the trial decision, but focused more on the wording of the
Act itself. He held that the words “in respect of the infringement” did
not limit a patentee to damages on “activities of the infringer that…in

Gerber Garment Technology, supra note 8 (Pat. Ct.).
Gerber Garment Technology, supra note 16 (C.A.).
60 Gerber Garment Technology, supra note 8 at 400 (Pat. Ct.).
61 Ibid at 402 (Pat. Ct.). At 403, Jacob J. then declined to set out the nature of the
58
59

foreseeability test.
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themselves constitute infringements.”62 Expanding on this notion, he
held that
the Patent Act is aimed at protecting patentees from
commercial loss resulting from the wrongful infringement
of their rights. That is only a slight gloss upon the wording
of the statute itself. In my judgement, again as a matter of
first impression, it does not distinguish between profit on
the sale of patented articles and profit on the sale of
convoyed goods.63

Staughton L.J. concluded that, in that case, there was no
dispute as to causation or remoteness, nor any ground of policy for
restricting the patentee‟s right to recover, and thus the appeal, in so
far as it sought to restrict the scope of recovery, should be dismissed.64
Although this quotation focuses on convoyed goods, the logic is
equally applicable to losses occurring after the expiry of the patent, in
particular in light of the fact that this case dealt with such damages.
Therefore, English law clearly recognizes the recoverability of
losses occurring after the expiry of the patent. The question is
whether Canada‟s laws are amenable to such an approach.
Returning to first principles, the patentee must be
compensated for the losses he or she suffered that are caused by the
infringement and are not too remote. Although the question must be
addressed based on the facts of each case, there does not seem to be
any legal or logical bar to recovery.
With respect to causation, it seems clear that an infringement
occurring during the life of the patent may cause lost sales after the
patent expires. Stated simply, the argument goes as follows: the
infringement allows the competitor to establish their business prior to
the end of the patent, allowing this competitor to accelerate its market
entry and increasing the number of sales that the patentee will lose
upon expiry of the patent. In other words, but for the infringement,
62
63

Gerber Garment Technology, supra note 16 at 451, Staughton L.J. (C.A.).
Ibid at 453, Staughton L.J. (C.A.). This first impression was confirmed later in the

judgment by a review of the case law revealing no rules barring damages on activities
other than the actual infringement.
64 Ibid at 456, Staughton L.J. (C.A.)
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the patentee would have enjoyed a larger market share and therefore
more sales.
As to remoteness, a patentee‟s loss of sales is, as mentioned
previously, almost always entirely foreseeable and this applies with
equal force to losses after the life of the patent. Further, instigating
such loss of sales may be the only true reason a competitor would
infringe a patent, other than the belief that it is not actually
infringing, since the competitor is not entitled to profit from its
infringing activities and therefore can only hope to gain some benefit
once those activities no longer infringe.
Therefore, applying basic damages principles, losses occurring
post expiry should be recoverable. One may argue that the future loss
aspect is too speculative. However, future losses have already been
recognized in Canadian patent law, as was noted above. Other
commentators have gone even further, claiming that “[d]amages can
also be awarded for prospective losses, as the consequences of the
infringement may continue for some time after the infringement has
been stopped.”65 Though the term „prospective‟ connotes a higher
degree of speculation than may be proper, the notion that a patentee
may be compensated for losses that have not yet occurred is correct.
In assessing future losses, the court will simply “make an estimate as
to what are the chances that a particular thing will or would have
happened and reflect those chances … in the amount of damages
which it awards.”66
The true question for post-expiry losses is whether the
evidence supports a finding that losses occurring subsequent to the
end of the patent were caused by infringing activity. This question
can no longer be simply dismissed on the old assumption that
patentees can only recover for infringing activities that occurred
during the life of the patent.
Another argument can be raised that the Act specifies when
damages will be awarded, thus supplanting the general damages
65

Randall J. Hofley & Nicholas McHaffie, “Litigation”, in Stikeman Elliott (ed.),

Intellectual Property Law: Canada (Huntington NY: Juris Publishing, 2002-) at 9-55.
See also Siebrasse et al, supra note 15 at 16: “In principle, damages encompass a loss of
future profits on sales that, but for the infringement, would have been made after the
date of the trial.”
66 Mallet v. McMonagle, [1970] A.C. 166 at 176, as cited in Gerber Garment
Technology, supra note 8 at 395 (Pat. Ct.).
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principles, and that it in no way provides for compensation to the
patentee for losses suffered after the patent expires. This argument
can be disposed of in two ways. First, as mentioned previously, an
infringement is akin to a statutory tort and therefore general damages
principles inform the analysis. To the extent that the Act overlaps the
principles, which is quite rare, those principles are displaced.
However, the act does not make reference to how damages are to be
assessed. Nor does it specify the extent to which damages apply
beyond setting out when they are triggered, namely an infringing
activity.
Second, the Act, by not restricting compensation to the
infringing act itself, does entitle the patentee to compensation for
losses beyond the patent‟s life. As mentioned previously, the Act
makes a person infringing a patent liable to the patentee “for all
damages sustained by the patentee … by reason of the infringement”67
(emphasis added). On its face, this statutorily imposed liability is
extremely broad. Nothing in the words of the provision limits
damages to the direct loss due to the infringing activity, for example,
the loss of a sale due to the sale of an infringing product. The wording
is also quite similar, in terms of its broadness, to that used in the
United Kingdom, where post-expiry damages have been awarded.
Despite the reluctance to assess losses occurring after the
expiry of the patent, the scope of patent damages has been very
liberally stated at times. One commentator claimed that “damages
seek to compensate the plaintiff for any losses suffered by the plaintiff
as a result of the infringement” 68 (emphasis added). Again, this
statement suggests a broader entitlement to relief than merely
damages directly caused by the infringing activity.
In AlliedSignal, the court held that the plaintiff is entitled to
compensation for “all damages flowing from infringement of the
patent within Canada, which may include profits lost on sales outside
Canada” 69 (emphasis added). If a Canadian patent right can be
understood to include damages occurring within Canada triggered by
lost sales outside of Canada, it should be legitimate to conclude that
the time-limited patent right allows recovery for losses occurring after
Act, supra note 1, s.55(2).
Hughes and Clarizio, Hughes and Woodley on Patents, supra note 5 at para. 53.
69 Allied Signal, supra note 28 at para. 33 (F.C.T.D.).
67
68
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the patent term triggered by infringements occurring within the
appropriate time frame.
One Canadian author thought it clear that the patentee is
entitled to damages for losses occurring after the end of the patent:
Should this be considered as an encroachment on the
principle that damages must be “caused” by the wrong
(causation) and should not be remote (foreseeability,
remoteness). Damages must result from the infringement
but the result may create to the right owner, damages
greater than the value of the articles that infringes. For
example, a fault may cause damages greater than the articles
destroyed, taking into account the need for causation and
foreseeability. If a baker carries on business on an island
and his bridge, his only way out of the island, is destroyed
through the fault of another, should the defendant be liable
for the value of the bridge only or also for the business lost
by the baker while he was unable to deliver his goods? The
answer is self-evident.70

B. EMERGING SIGNS OF CHANGE
Recently, a shift toward recognizing post-expiry losses seems
to be occurring, though no court has awarded damages for such losses.
The clearest signal came in Bayer Healthcare., where Justice
Mactavish, though not required to decide this issue, reviewed recent
Canadian and English law and held that the possibility of recovering
post-expiry damages could not be dispelled:
Damages in patent cases are intended to put the plaintiff in
the position that it would have been in, but for the
infringement. It is, in my view, entirely speculative for
Bayer to say at this point that it will not be able to recover
damages for any losses that it may suffer in the post-expiry
period, as a matter of law, and indeed there is authority for
the proposition that such damages are indeed recoverable.71

70
71

Dimock, Intellectual Property Disputes, supra note 46 at 17-7.
Bayer Healthcare, supra note 7 at para, 56.
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The federal court has also made suggestive comments to the
same effect:
[D]amages will be calculated in reasonable fashion,
providing a normal remedy for infringement, if the trial
finds that to have occurred, whether those are caused
before or after expiry of the plaintiffs‟ patent. 72

In both those cases, the court held that damages in the postexpiry period were quantifiable.73 In the latter case, the court
supported its conclusion by pointing to the evidence of experts to
satisfy itself that any loss of market, regardless of whether the
defendant entered the market before or after the expiry of the patent,
could be calculated and that loss could be quantified in damages.74
C. CONCLUSION
Sound arguments founded in both general damages principles
and a closer reading of the Act itself, as well as recent case law
questioning the old assumption that a patentee may claim
compensation only for losses incurred during the life of the militate
against dismissing out of hand a patentee‟s entitlement to damages for
post-expiry losses. Where the evidence in a case supports the
conclusion that losses occurring after the patent ends were caused by
an infringing activity during the life of the patent, the award of
damages should include compensation for such losses.
IV
SPRINGBOARDING INJUNCTIONS
When granting an interlocutory injunction, the court must,
Bristol-Meyers Squibb, supra note 7 at para. 22. At para. 29, MacKay J. also
obliquely states that “an award of damages or an accounting of profits may indirectly
compensate, at least in part, any loss to the plaintiffs arising from reduction in the
overall NH market,” which seems to have included market loss after the patent
expires. The former dicta was approved of in Bayer Healthcare, supra note 7 at para.
57.
73 Bayer Healthcare, supra note 7 at para, 58. Bristol-Meyers Squibb, supra note 7 at
para. 19.
74 Bristol-Meyers Squibb, supra note 7 at para. 21.
72

152

among other things, determine that the plaintiff will suffer irreparable
harm. This has often been the hurdle patentees have stumbled over
when seeking an interlocutory injunction. In light of the conclusion
above that losses occurring after a patent ends are recoverable, can it
truly be said that a defendant springboarding into the post-expiry
market irreparably harms the patentee?
A. RELUCTANCE TO GRANT INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTIONS IN PATENT
ACTIONS
As mentioned previously, interlocutory injunctions are rarely
granted in patent actions. This may very well extend to sprinboarding
activities.
In the most recent patent action75 to address springboarding,
Bayer Healthcare Mactavish J. confirmed that interlocutory
injunctions will seldom be ordered in patent cases on the basis of a
defendant‟s springboarding activity. In light of her conclusions that
post-expiry damages are of a quantifiable nature and potentially
recoverable, Mactavish J. declined to order the injunction because
irreparable harm had not been established.76 More specifically,
Mactavish J. held that the plaintiff‟s evidence did not support a
finding that the damages were unquantifiable,77 that permanent
market loss would result due to the infringement,78 or that the
defendant‟s head start in the market would prevent the plaintiff from
growing their business or making an orderly transition to a postexpiry reality.79
The Federal Court had come to a very similar conclusion in
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. et al. v. Apotex Inc. In that case, the
plaintiffs were made aware of the defendant‟s intention to sell their
Bayer Healthcare, supra note 7.
Ibid. at paras. 51-58.
77 Ibid. at paras. 59-60.
78 Ibid. at paras. 61-64. This point is discussed under the heading of Special Industry
75
76

Consideration, but the argument essentially goes that generics generally overtake the
market immediately upon the expiry of patents, and thus the infringement is not the
cause of the post-expiry losses.
79 Ibid. at paras. 66-86. The evidence suggested, for example, at para. 75-78, that
Sandoz might not purchase the generic version of the drug due to organizational
buying procedures, and, at para. 82, that hospital pharmacists would nonetheless
select the plaintiff‟s product if both version were available.
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patented pharmaceutical product prior to the expiry of the patent and
thus launched an action for infringement and sought a quia timet
interlocutory injunction. The motion was denied.80 As mentioned
previously, MacKay J. first held that post-expiry damages were
quantifiable.81 MacKay J. also referred to the possibility of the
defendant not paying the damages awarded against them as
“speculative as best.”82 Finally, MacKay J. disposed of the plaintiff‟s
third claim, that it will suffer a decline in its total market share,
primarily due to a lack of evidence. This is an inherent difficulty in
establishing irreparable harm for springboarding interlocutory
injunctions:
Although the plaintiffs argue it will not make "good
business sense" to continue promotion of its NH product,
they have failed, in my view, to demonstrate that there will
be a shrinking market caused by Apotex' entry on the
market or that this would constitute irreparable harm as
defined in RJR-MacDonald , supra . In my opinion, any
decline in the overall market for NH, and any harm
resulting therefrom, is purely speculative, at this stage. It
might well be caused, at least in part, by any decision of the
plaintiffs to decrease sales promotion, if that course be
taken, rather than solely by Apotex' entry into the market.
On the other hand, if the plaintiffs were to continue
promoting their product, this might result in an increased
volume of combined sales for both the plaintiffs and
Apotex. Moreover, if Apotex is found to infringe the
plaintiffs' patent at trial, an award of damages or an
accounting of profits may indirectly compensate, at least in
part, any loss to the plaintiffs arising from reduction in the
overall NH market.

The courts easily reject as speculation any potential damage
80
81

Bristol-Meyers Squibb, supra note 7 at paras. 31.
Ibidi. at paras. 17-23. It must be noted that MacKay J. never explicitly claimed that

these damages were recoverable. As seen earlier, he merely stated, at para. 22, that
damages, including post-expiry damages, would be “calculated in a reasonable
fashion, providing a normal remedy for infringement” or, at para.29, that market loss,
apparently including after the patent expires, might be “indirectly compensate[d], at
least in part.”
82 Ibid. at para. 24.
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that would arise after the patent expires, most likely due to the near
impossibility of accurately predicting the quantum of damages or even
identifying its precise nature, yet they also maintain that these postexpiry damages are quantifiable, even if with difficulty.
B. PRECEDENT FOR PREVENTING SPRINGBOARDING
However, there is precedent for ordering an interlocutory
injunction to prevent an infringing competitor from springboarding.
In Procter & Gamble Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Canada Inc., the
plaintiff attempted to prevent the defendant from entering the market
prior to the patent‟s expiry. Teitlebaum J. granted a rare interlocutory
injunction for springboarding, holding that the evidence presented by
the plaintiffs, uncontradicted by the defendants, established there was
a “very serious potential that plaintiffs will lose some market share.”
More specifically, the “jump start” the defendants would obtain would
make it the “second most „dominant player‟” and thus put them in “a
position to take a market share which would adversely affect the
plaintiff‟s.”83
Significantly, Teitlebaum J. followed dicta from RJRMacDonald to the effect that “permanent market loss” is irreparable
harm.84 As with the more recent cases, the issue then revolves around
the quality of the evidence, which the judge found lacking for the
defendant. The plaintiff‟s evidence here established that programs to
protect the plaintiff‟s market for that product, such as brand loyalty
programs, would be stymied85 and that allowing one competitor to
enter the market would significantly increase competition both
during the term of the patent and immediately after because it may
encourage others to do the same.86
In Carbo Ceramics Inc. v. China Ceramics Proppant Ltd.87
(Carbo Ceramics), Shore J. addressed two different irreparable harm
arguments: inability to pay damages and springboarding. On the

83
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Procter & Gamble, supra note 42 at 177-178 (F.C.T.D.).
See however Bayer Healthcare, supra note 7 at paras. 61-63, which clearly

distinguished this dicta in the context of pharmaceutical patents.
85 Procter & Gamble, supra note 42 at 175-177 (F.C.T.D.).
86 Procter & Gamble, supra note 42 at 175 (F.C.T.D.).
87 Carbo Ceramics Inc. v. China Ceramics Proppant Ltd. (2004), 34 C.P.R. (4th) 423
(F.C.) [Carbo Ceramics].
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evidence, the former was easily demonstrated and thus irreparable
harm was established.88 With respect to the latter, Shore J. noted that
the defendant‟s entry into the market late in the life of the patent
clearly raised the issue of springboarding. Even more damning was the
fact that the defendant sold the infringing product to one of the
plaintiff‟s clients, who then virtually stopped buying that product
from the plaintiff.89 Shore J. then concluded that the defendant was
springboarding, and therefore obtained “an advantage for which an
award of damages would be insufficient.”90 Shore J. thus explicitly
recognized that springboarding itself provides an advantage that
irreparably harms the patentee. The interlocutory injunction was
therefore granted.91
The result in Carbo Ceramics was affirmed on appeal.
However the Court of Appeal ignored the fact that springboarding
was addressed at the irreparable harm stage and examined it within
the context of the balance of convenience. Letourneau J.A., for a
unanimous court, held that springboarding was a factor that might
sway a neutral balance of convenience in favour of the plaintiff.92
Although addressing springboarding at a different step of the analysis,
the Court of Appeal nonetheless recognized that such infringing
activity would cause the defendant to “suffer a loss of part of the
market likely to endure after the expiry of the patent, as well as a
disadvantage for which an award of damages would be insufficient.”93

Ibid. at paras. 22-28 (F.C.).
Ibid. at paras. 30-31 (F.C.).
90 Ibid. at para. 32 (F.C.).
91 Ibid. at paras. 36, 33-35, 18-20 (F.C.). At paras. 18-20 and 33-35, Shore J. also held
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that a serious issue was established and that the balance of convenience favoured the
status quo, which was held to be prior to the infringement. The full test for an
interlocutory injunction was therefore satisfied.
92 Carbo Ceramics Inc. v. China Ceramics Proppant Ltd. (2004), 34 C.P.R. (4th) 431 at
para. 8 (F.C.A.) [Carbo Ceramics]. Springboarding effectively tips the balance of
convenience in that it sets the status quo at a pre-infringement period. This is clearly
articulated by Letourneau J.A., at para. 12: “To accept the appellant's contention that
the status quo should be fixed at the time at which the injunction was sought would
be to allow the appellant not only to continue the alleged infringements, but also to
carry on its alleged „springboarding‟ with the blessings of the Court.”
93 Ibid. at para. 8 (F.C.A.). Springboarding effectively tips the balance of convenience
in that it sets the status quo at a pre-infringement period. This is clearly articulated
by Letourneau J.A., at para. 12: “To accept the appellant's contention that the status
quo should be fixed at the time at which the injunction was sought would be to allow
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Clearly, therefore, the springboarding that occurred in this case fell
within the definition of irreparable harm. Further, as Letourneau J.A.
never addressed the issue of irreparable harm prior to affirming the
decision to grant the interlocutory injunction, the Court of Appeal
implicitly accepted the trial judge‟s conclusion that springboarding
produces irreparable harm.
Cullen J., in Baker Hughes Inc. v. Galvanic Analytical Systems
Ltd., linked springboarding with irreparable harm in a slightly
different manner.
Although expressly recognizing that the
“defendant will therefore obtain an additional period, or springboard,
into the market-place to the irreparable harm of the plaintiff,”94 Culen
J. also noted that “years of sales of the patented product have enabled
the plaintiff to establish a reputation for itself and the product which
would … suffer „irreparable harm‟ … if the defendant were able to
continue sales of its product.”95 Cullen J. is clearly suggesting, without
explanation, that eroding the reputation developed during the term of
the patent prior to the expiry of the patent leads to irreparable harm.
C. CONCLUSION
The weight of the case law currently militates against granting
a request for an interlocutory injunction to prevent springboarding
activities. This difficulty is compounded by the strong argument, and
possibly the emerging trend towards, recognizing the legitimacy of
awarding damages for losses occurring after the patent expires. Since
applicants for interlocutory injunctions must show that they will be
irreparably harmed if the infringing activity is allowed to continue,
recognition of post-expiry damages would severely impair their
capacity to do so since damages for post-expiry market loss would
seem to be adequate. Nothing prevents the applicant, however, from
arguing that special conditions apply, such as a defendant‟s incapacity
to pay a damages award.

the appellant not only to continue the alleged infringements, but also to carry on its
alleged „springboarding‟ with the blessings of the Court.”
94 Baker Hughes, supra note 10 at 515 (F.C.T.D.).
95 Ibid. at 516 (F.C.T.D.). Cullen J. also noted that “damages will not suffice for the
protection lost under the patent, the need to find a new distributor, the actual
locating of a new distributor, and the new distributor's claim and the plaintiff's claim
that the product infringes.”
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There is, however, case law to suggest that springboarding,
due to the market loss that ensues, irreparably harms the patentee. So
long as this market loss is permanent, this is consistent with explicit
statements from the Supreme Court. In addition, the federal court has
also suggested that losing the opportunity to develop, or maintain, the
company‟s or product‟s reputation during the life of the patent
irreparably harms the patentee.
It is clear therefore that the question of irreparable harm
should not be dismissed out of hand by the courts. Again, the
question should be addressed on the evidence in each case.
Admittedly, it may be difficult to identify evidence which establishes
irreparable harm, especially if post-expiry losses are recoverable. In
particular, certain industries may have more difficulty establishing
such harm than others. One industry that may face considerable
difficulty when seeking an interlocutory injunction to prevent
springboarding is the pharmaceutical industry. The Federal Court has
previously commented that
given the unique dynamic of the pharmaceutical
industry…, it is predictable that as soon as a patent expires,
the innovator of the drug in question will lose a substantial
portion of its market share to generic competitors, without
any realistic expectation that the innovator company will
be able to recover that market share in the future. 96

Therefore, since the patentee would almost immediately lose
its market in any event, the springboarding would not cause
irreparable harm.
Other industries, however, may find the task much less
arduous. Some high technology industry participants, for example,
depend strongly on “convincing customers to be early adopters” to
ensure “continued customer loyalty,” thus providing the successful
company with a “broad base of benefits” subsequent to adoption.97
Therefore loss of these early adopters may in fact lead to permanent
market loss.
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Bayer Healthcare, supra note 7 at para. 63.
Siebrasse et al, supra note 15 at 1.
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V
CONCLUSION
It is clear that a patentee derives a benefit from a patent even
after it expires and therefore may be harmed post-expiry by acts
committed during the life of the patent. A defendant found liable for
infringement must compensate the patentee, in appropriate
circumstances, for all reasonably foreseeable losses caused by the
infringement, including those occurring after the patent expires.
Although it is generally assumed that only losses occurring during the
term of a patent are recoverable, nothing in the Act itself precludes
recovery for losses suffered beyond its expiry. As patent infringement
is analogous to a tort, tort liability rules are applicable and well-suited
to assess damages in patent infringement cases. Concerns of unlimited
liability are answered by applying the well-understood tort law
concepts of causation and remoteness. The recoverability of postexpiry patent losses therefore becomes primarily an evidentiary issue,
namely whether the losses, typically loss of sales, actually flow from
the original infringement. Recent Canadian case law has in fact
signalled a willingness to consider the recoverability of post-expiry
patent losses, and at least one English court has granted relief for such
losses.
Accordingly, the issuance of interlocutory injunctions to
prevent patent infringement may become even less frequent.
Interlocutory injunctions were already seldom granted because of
judicial reluctance to characterize losses arising from patent
infringement as irreparable. In rare cases, infringers have been
restrained from attempting to gain accelerated entry into the market
after the patent expires. However, even then the courts have been
reluctant to explicitly hold that the losses from the infringement itself
were irreparable. Other factors, such as permanent market loss or
damage to reputation, often motivated the final decision.
Accepting that post-expiry losses are recoverable further
limits the possibility of obtaining interlocutory relief to prevent
accelerated market entry by requiring the court to consider only
special circumstances, such as the plaintiff‟s potential bankruptcy,
rather than merely the post-expiry losses. In certain cases, for
example in the high technology industry where early adopters are key
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to a business‟ success, special circumstances may militate in favour of a
finding that irreparable harm will ensue. However, it is more likely
that patentees will seldom successfully argue that losses occurring
after the patent expires are inadequately compensated by damages
precisely because they can recover those losses in court should the
injunction not issue.
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